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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**STOPPING THE NEXT GLOBAL TERRORIST:
A CASE STUDY OF HEZBOLLAH IN ARGENTINA**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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9 Feb 2004

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INTRODUCTION

“If Albright, Clinton, and the American gang think that if they attack Hezbollah from Washington one day, we will tremble in fear, then they should know that we would be glad; for their political, media, and military attack would only make us more convinced that truth has been on our side. When the devil curses us, that means we are with Allah.”

Hassan Nasrallah, February 17, 2000

As we move beyond the defined state threats of the cold war, we face a new threat that is far more widely based. The direction of military commanders is to combat this threat. To attempt to isolate 21st century terrorists to a specific country or a localized region is doomed to fail; we live and operate in an age of super communication and super access, characterized by global reach across all pillars of power. Globalization is the culmination of this age. The benefits reaped for those who participate in globalization are tremendous, but equally tremendous are the disadvantages for those who are excluded. One artifact of exclusion from globalization is the new breed of terrorist that we face: the global terrorist. He becomes the exemplar for poor and disenfranchised people; those who are wholly or partially disconnected from the global arena. His roots reach back to those disconnected masses, through insurgency and insurrection. His power lies in finding and recruiting those disconnected masses. He seduces them to his ideology, one designed to keep them disconnected from globalization and allied to him.

This paper will use a case study of the Hezbollah operations in Argentina¹ to serve as an illustrative example of the urgency for reconnecting these masses to globalization. Why Argentina? Terrorism has taken root in this small country and already has taken lives. While occurring in SOUTHCOM’s theater, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, directed

¹ In 1992, Hezbollah bombed the Israeli embassy in the capital of Argentina, Buenos Aires, killing 38 people and injuring more than 200. Two years later Hezbollah conducted a similar style attack, again in Buenos Aires, this time against the Jewish Community’s AMIA building, killing 200 people and injuring 250.

these actions from Lebanon - illustrating the global nature of this threat. Studying the dynamics of Argentina, and countries like it, is the first step toward preventing global terrorists from reaching U.S. interests as they did in 2001. By severing the connection of poor and disenfranchised masses to flawed ideology and reconnecting them to globalization, terrorist recruitment will be prevented, and its power will be eviscerated.

Through an analysis of Critical Strengths and Weaknesses, Hezbollah's Center of Gravity will be determined and courses of action for the Combatant Commander discussed.

ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Detailed analysis of Hezbollah's operations in Argentina produced surprises, even for the author, as Hezbollah's critical strengths significantly outnumbered their critical weaknesses (figure 1). Analysis of their critical strengths reveals distinct vulnerabilities that will be addressed in relation to their center of gravity: recruitment.

Figure 1: Hezbollah Critical Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Weaknesses

Critical Strengths	Critical Vulnerabilities	Critical Weaknesses
No Formal State Allegiance with Argentina Muslim Presence Argentina's Poverty Hezbollah's Ideology Image that Inspires Argentine to Masses PR Capabilities	Reliance on Illegal Funding Legitimacy in the World Ability to Train and Operate without Harassment	Disconnection from Globalization

CRITICAL STRENGTHS

No Formal State Allegiance with Argentina: Argentina denies any allegiance with Hezbollah, to the degree that Argentine officials have stated publicly that they do not believe

that they have terrorists in their country; yet Hezbollah operates and exists in Argentina. The objective of their presence is simple – to recruit their future. Hezbollah openly advertises itself as a Lebanese resistance movement, a terrorist organization, whose goals and objectives are to achieve an Islamic government and the removal of Israel.ⁱ However, since the mid-1980s, Hezbollah clerics and members of other Islamist organizations have been proselytizing and planting operatives from the Middle East, and recruiting new members among the residents of the Tri-border region.²

Robert Oakley, U.S. State Department coordinator for counterterrorism during the 1980s, noted, “state sponsored terrorism is in some ways easier to control because if you could put the pressure on the states then they could stop the [terrorist groups].”ⁱⁱ Hezbollah exploits Argentina’s lack of action against them to reach back to Islamic fundamentalists of the Middle East.

Muslim Presence: The Arab population of the Tri-border region is believed to number over 20,000 (about one in every 30 residents), most of whom are Lebanese Muslims.ⁱⁱⁱ

Additionally the area is recognized for its lack of internal security. In May 2001, American authorities warned that people were flowing into the area unchecked. Court cases already initiated allege production of fraudulent documents involving, among others, the former consul of Miami, Carlos Weiss, and vice-consul Jose Luis Coscia – accused of issuing 150 irregular visas, 18 of those to Arab citizens, three of whom are wanted by the U.S. Justice Department.^{iv}

Argentina’s Poverty: Argentina is attempting to globalize, but has not achieved this objective. It is plagued by poverty. The masses have little money or influence. The extent of funding coming into Argentina to support Hezbollah is difficult to estimate. According to

² The Tri-Border region is the area of Argentina that borders with Brazil and Paraguay.

Paraguayan Interior Minister Julio Cesar Fanego, from 1999-2001, Hezbollah received anywhere from \$50-550 million, just from the Tri-border region. Brazilian authorities have estimated that in recent years criminals in the Tri-border area have been laundering approximately \$6 billion annually and that at least \$261 million was sent from Islamist organizations operating in the Tri-border region to the Middle East in the year 2000 alone. Most of it went to Hezbollah.^v The amounts are dramatic in view of Argentina's poverty. The GDP per capita in 2003 was \$10,500 with 37% of the country's 38 million living below the poverty line. In a country with a 21.5% unemployment rate and a 41% inflation rate (2002, yearend), the idea of having a job where one can gain access to this amount of money can be seductive to locals.

Hezbollah's Ideology: The allegiance of people who feel they are oppressed by their poverty and looking for a place to blame their position can be easily earned by charismatic leaders. The bleak atmosphere of this region makes the immediate employment offered by Hezbollah attractive. It is the teachings of the Koran, specifically crafted and geared to its audience, that Hezbollah uses to give a new purpose to the lives of those they employ in Argentina. Islamism is taught and preached readily to the local populace, who are all looking for two things: money and influence. Hezbollah offers both. As soon as Hezbollah employs the poor, unemployed locals, Hezbollah gives them money for their efforts - efforts that support Hezbollah - and teaches them that Islamism will give them a voice that will be heard. Oliver Roy defines Islamism as

“the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism which claims to recreate a true Islamic society, not by simply imposing the sharia, but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action. Islamists see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a political ideology which should be integrated into all aspects of society...To Islamists, the Islamic State should unite the ummah as much as possible, not being restricted to a specific nation. Such a state attempts to recreate the golden age of the first decades of

Islam and supersede tribal, ethnic, and national divides, whose resilience is attributed to the believer's abandonment of the true tenets of Islam or colonial policy.”^{vi}

They observe the influence and prominence awarded to other Hezbollah that come through Argentina and the Tri-border area for training. These recruits learn stories of overcoming oppression, gaining influence, and being part of Hezbollah's family of Islamism.

Image that Inspires Argentine Masses: Hassan Nasrallah built his image as one of a poor youth originating from a family that lived in a refugee camp. He associates himself with the people he recruits through stories of helping his father, living on bread and water, and sleeping on a simple mattress for a bed during the period of his life before Hezbollah^{vii}. His popularity has risen dramatically among Muslims and Islamists as he advertises himself as “the only Muslim in history to defeat Israel on the battlefield,”^{viii} referring to the liberation of Lebanon from Israel in May 2000.³ This image is one to which Argentines - frustrated with their poverty and disconnected from the modern world - feel they can relate.

The raid of Assad Ahmad Barakat, an alleged ringleader of Hezbollah's financial network in the Tri-border area, revealed a letter from Nasrallah noting that he “is one of the most thankful for the contributions Assad Ahmad Barakat has sent.”^{ix} The same raid revealed numerous amounts of literature, propaganda, and videos encouraging young men to join Hezbollah to fight Israel and become suicide bombers.^x Widespread images of Nasrallah reinforce his leadership to new recruits as their leader of their new world.

PR Capabilities: Nasrallah is noted for his ability to craft media to his advantage and raise the fury and excitement of masses in public forums. Anderson Cooper, CNN Anchor, made the following comment after an interview of Nasrallah, “on the one hand that very public statement [‘death to America’] in front of that huge, enormous crowd, you know, greeted

with a rapturous response, and then the statements to [MacVicar during interview] are clearly a case of different audiences. It would lead me to believe that this is a group, which certainly has a sense of PR, public relations, and knows how to target the message.”^{xi} It can be argued that the poorest people, the ones whom Hezbollah seeks to recruit, do not have access to such forms of media, but Nasrallah works in all mediums and with local support. In Argentina there is a plethora of media outlets despite the poverty of the country: 260 AM radio stations; over 1,000 FM radio stations; 6 shortwave radio stations; 42 broadcast television stations (more than the average basic cable in the U.S.); and three internet service providers. All have displayed his ideology openly or inadvertently. Additionally, Hezbollah operates its own television station, Al-Manar, has several radio stations and magazines dedicated to itself, and hosts its own website (www.hezbollah.net). His command of such widespread media forums gives the masses a level of access to his message that is difficult to counter (and remains unchallenged by the U.S.). The media fails to use proper terms from the Koran (i.e. referring to Hezbollah’s criminal activities as a “jihad” gives credence to their cause as a Holy War) and instead relies on Western terms that further reinforce the disconnection of the recruits. Nasrallah personally stated that “a thousand suicide commandos are ready to strike Israel all over the world”^{xii} just one month prior to the AMIA bombing. Clearly his network got the same message.

CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

Reliance on Illegal Funding: Former Ambassador Philip Wilcox, former State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, openly noted that Hezbollah cells were actively involved

³ In May 2000, Following a severe campaign of terrorist strikes orchestrated by Nasrallah, the Israeli army withdrew from southern Lebanon.

in narcotics trafficking and smuggling in 1995. Since 1995, cases of software piracy, money laundering, and human trafficking have been proven as well. The goal of President Bush's policy to target the finances of terrorists is clear – seizure of their funds. Outright seizure of this volume of funding is not as simple as it seems; Blanca Madani asserts “the triple frontier is the largest center of commerce in the country and the Arab community there is frequently described by the press as the ‘pillar’ of economic activity. Should this community abandon the region en masse, the impact could be devastating for the country's economy.”^{xiii}

However, it is a misconception that the community would abandon the region. Rebuilding and strengthening its legitimate business connections with the global marketplace would ultimately strengthen the economy, taking finances away from Hezbollah and returning them back to region.

Legitimacy in the World: Hezbollah desperately seeks its own legitimacy and uses its ideology to attempt to buttress itself against rebuke. The promise of influence given in its ideology necessitates legitimacy. Brigitte Nacos accurately defines this reliance on public image: “one dimension of power can be construed as the ability to have one's account become the perceived reality of others. Those actors who manage to get their views and positions most often and most prominently covered by the mass media have the best chance to influence the perceptions of others...and thereby gain an advantage.”^{xiv} Hezbollah firmly denied the accusations of involvement in the bombings in 1992 and 1994, recognizing that taking credit for these acts of terrorism would irrevocably label them as extremist. When discussing such activities Nasrallah replied “the story about Hezbollah's external branch or external security unit is groundless...whoever claims that such a security apparatus exists must present evidence to Lebanon and to Hezbollah...Ladies and gentlemen, I need not

elaborate, because these are silly and groundless accusations.”^{xv} Nasrallah clearly recognizes that while his ability to sell his message is his strength, Hezbollah’s image (as a movement struggling against oppressors) is vulnerable. So fearful of being branded as an extremist by the media, a brand that he knows would steal away his ability to reap new followers, Nasrallah has specifically redefined the term of terrorist to take a new meaning that would support his mission: “we in Hezbollah are proud that America, the Great Satan, accuses us of being a terrorist body. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, a ‘terrorist’ is every noble person, every free person, anyone who adheres to his principles and rights and protects the honor of his homeland and nation...”^{xvi} This message is one that he continues to espouse in Argentina through his operatives. Nasrallah’s loss of public image as a Shiekh leading a “holy cause” would force a ripple in his followers; the negative associations of being labeled a “terrorist” – as opposed to freedom fighter or holy warrior – would apply to them.

Ability to Train and Operate without Harassment: In 1994, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister, Mordechai Gur, warned “Hezbollah was using [Argentina] as a base for terrorist activities”^{xvii}. Key to the location of Argentina for Hezbollah operatives is their ability to set up and conduct training and operations. In Tom Knowlton’s “*Al Qaeda and Hezbollah Plot a Dangerous Alliance*,” a U.S. defense analyst explains the area has an “unstable, often corrupt, government structure with weak economic platforms. Their porous borders and largely unsupervised waterways and airfields are highly conducive to the conducting of illicit operations that go undetected.”^{xviii} During the years before the 1992 and 1994 attacks, Hezbollah established networks of sympathizers and operatives. While unclassified figures are not available that can quantify the success of Hezbollah training, it is clear that the lack of

a negative response toward Hezbollah after the 1992 bombing was the catalyst in the 1994 bombing. Hezbollah continues to use Argentina to advance the skills of its own operatives, exploiting the lack of internal security to identify training facilities and monitor the flow of operatives in and out. Improved border control and law enforcement actions in Argentina would fill the void of structure and law enforcement that is being exploited.

CRITICAL WEAKNESSES

While the ratio of strengths to weaknesses appears daunting, Hezbollah's essential weakness in Argentina, Argentina's disconnection from globalization, is severe. Hezbollah's ideology is based on keeping recruits excluded from globalization. Their ability to initiate insurgency and rebellion is built upon proffering a vision that will give these displaced masses something with which to connect – and with immediate results. Recruits are persuaded that the actions they undertake on behalf of their new brotherhood are just and righteous. They are convinced that their voice will be heard and their actions make a difference.

Having to rely on Argentina to remain outside of globalization is especially daunting when taken in an international context. Globalization does not intimate that Argentina would be allying itself with the U.S., but that Argentina would be allying itself with the world. In this context, it is clear that Hezbollah's weakness is one that is open to influence by the world.

Hezbollah recruitment in Argentina can not be stopped by removing the influx of financial backing or shutting down its websites alone. Removing the yearning of the impoverished masses for something that will take them away from their disillusioned and

disenfranchised lives by connecting them to their own economy – one with international recognition and potential – would leave Hezbollah recruitment efforts to wither on the vine.

THE HUB OF ALL POWER – HEZBOLLAH'S CENTER OF GRAVITY

Hezbollah's center of gravity in Argentina lies not in the operations that have been conducted nor in their effects, but in their ability to recruit. The people who execute Hezbollah's fatwas (direction or orders) act as Hezbollah's power source. Nasrallah is acutely aware of his reliance on recruitment; this awareness dominates his actions and serves as an underlying motive for all he does.

Nasrallah's choice to locate Hezbollah in Argentina was not whimsical; he first chose an area outside of globalization – in the gap of globalization that is filled with have-nots.^{xix} Narrowing his focus within the gap to Argentina, noted for its Muslim population and porous borders, he is able to craft his message in a manner that will appeal directly to the poor and disconnected masses. From these masses he is able to identify and create insurgents, appealing to their desire to become connected with something bigger than their limited existence can provide. From these recruits he is able to form networks of operatives. This is occurring thousands of miles from his alleged focus of Lebanon. The attacks in 1992 and 1994 serve as standing proof of his ability to establish and use these networks. Whereas U.S. citizens see advertisements for joining a branch of the military or a particular organization, a Muslim in Argentina would see an advertisement that discusses the righteousness of Nasrallah's ideology. This message is interlaced with promises of a prosperous future; the implicit message is that by espousing his ideology one will become a part of something bigger than oneself.

THE FIX

EVISCERATING THE RECRUITMENT

One of the first tenets listed in our *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* is to position forces and assets to deny access to new recruits. Examination of Nasrallah's recruitment in Argentina reveals both direct and indirect paths to stopping his recruitment efforts. Every approach requires international, multi-agency support where the military will not usually be the lead instrument of power.

The Direct Approach: Information Warfare against Nasrallah's ability to use his own media to sell his message and to exploit ours to publicize his ideology, thereby giving Hezbollah legitimacy, must be aggressively waged. This "war of ideas" approach needs to target the minds of the Argentines. While the goal is to create a positive and healthy democracy that favors the U.S., it is not a hearts and minds approach geared to win support and admiration of U.S. policy - admiration is not critical to success. It must remove Nasrallah's ability to sell his "join me and connect with something bigger than yourself" message and replace it with one of reconnecting with the world market and world systems. This political battle requires focus from the general population. It necessitates awareness of the policy as one of public empowerment and growth. To succeed at winning the minds requires focus on the poor, unemployed or under-employed, destitute masses as well as local influential icons (political, religious, media...). Such a program must be conducted with cultural sensitivities as its core, using the same medium as Nasrallah's ideology to eradicate his message. This message

must expose the deviation of Nasrallah's ideology from the Koran and the fraudulent nature of his message.

In November 2001, Charlotte Beers was announced as the Department of State's Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Resultant of her efforts numerous high-quality products have emerged. Included are "*The Network of Terrorism*," "*Muslim Life in America*," and other items aimed at dispelling the fraudulent statements in fatwas and falsely-based ideologies. This is a start in the right direction; however, continued focus and effort is required to effectively invalidate Hezbollah's message.

The Indirect Approach: An economic approach focused on connecting Argentina to the world market will offer a viable choice for the disconnected populace – connect to the rest of the world or connect to Hezbollah. The State Department's African Growth Opportunity Act created more than 90,000 jobs for destitute Africans in two years and continues to expand. A similar approach to Argentina and the Tri-border area is essential to return locals to the workforce. In such a poor economy, where inflation rises at a startling rate and locals are dealing with staggering unemployment figures, the ground is fertile for exploitation by the lure of Nasrallah's ideology. It is also fertile for reconnection with globalization. Our Strategy for Combating Terrorism accurately assesses that "ongoing U.S. efforts to resolve regional disputes, foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, while not necessarily focused on combating terrorism, contribute to the campaign by addressing underlying conditions that terrorists often seek to manipulate to their advantage."^{xx} Unfortunately the social, economic, and political reversal of an entire country can not be affected easily or quickly. It requires a

dedicated effort under the lead of diplomatic and economic instruments of power, with the support of military and information organizations.

As Argentina wrestles with recessions and economic hardship, illegal activities to reap “quick money” will remain prevalent. Direct intervention in the illegal activities that serve to pull in and finance Hezbollah, through an international approach, will remove the primary method of finance by Hezbollah operatives in Argentina. Recent efforts to stop such illegal activities have netted results (e.g. arrests of Arafat Ismail and Mohammed Ali in conjunction with the Barakat’s Ltd and Saleh Limited Ltd money laundering scandal⁴), but these are merely the beginning. While the State department placed Hezbollah on a formal list of terrorist organizations in 2001, enabling seizure of their financial assets, efforts must be made to prevent Hezbollah’s money making activities before money is made through a campaign directed at identification, arrest, and exposure. Additionally, stopping the movement of illegally garnered funds, narcotics, and goods requires stronger border protection. The issue of border control is one area in which the U.S. has specific expertise. Without this control, even the best efforts are fruitless.⁵

Those conducting these activities must be dealt with as criminals for how they make their money and how they channel their funds. Potential involvement by the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one consideration. In addition, such efforts merit the integrated support of our military and law enforcement power to combat the current problems of rampant corruption and a lack of government capability.

THE ROLE OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDER

⁴ Barakat set up a large network of businesses that were involved in illicit fundraising for Hezbollah. Remittances to Hezbollah are believed to have totaled up to \$50 million dollars since 1995.

⁵ Ali Khali Mehri, arrested for having funneled millions of dollars from illegal enterprises directly to Hezbollah, was able to escape capture while released on bail and remains at-large.

The bombings in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 were not the actions of a radical Argentine insurgent. They were terrorist actions directed from Lebanon, half a world away. They were the actions of a global terrorist. Fundamental to every Combatant Commander's operational planning is combating terrorism in his theater. This is a matter of fighting global terrorists that operate without borders and outside of our defined geographic theaters. Efforts directed at stopping Hezbollah in Argentina through denying recruitment efforts can not be done by using our pillars of influence in isolation from one another. To surmise that these efforts could be undertaken without the capabilities and expertise inherent in the Combatant Commander and his staff is equivalent to offering a recipe for protracted failure. It is the involvement of the the Combatant Commander that serves as the synergistic element. He serves as a supporting element to these efforts, a role that is arguably more difficult than serving as the lead. The activities that effectively remove the Hezbollah threat fall under two overlapping themes: Homeland Security and Defense.

As Homeland Security efforts move forward, the myriad of Other Government Organizations (OGOs) and Non Government Organizations (NGOs) operating in support of reconnecting Argentina to globalization come with unique skill sets that require integration. As we learned from Operation Restore Hope, "operating with HROs [Humanitarian Relief Organizations] under an assumption that a chain of command existed was like trying to put a square peg in a round hole. Instead what was needed was constant negotiation with everyone involved at every step of the operation."^{xxi}

The appointment of SOCCOM as the lead in the Global War on Terrorism does not mean that defense involvement will be limited to military support of SOF operations. The Combatant Commander will need to use his forces to demonstrate military presence and to

support intelligence efforts directed toward law enforcement operations. Integration with other functional commanders will be required in order to achieve success in identifying and removing Hezbollah recruitment efforts aimed at insurgents. Examples of this would include coordinating strike and intelligence operations in this theater with STRATCOM, movement of forces through TRANSCOM, and coordination of force flow with EUCOM and CENTCOM.

The Combatant Commander needs to be involved as a facilitator of operations, working in horizontal integration with the numerous agencies that will be flowing in and out of his theater of operations. The role of the Combatant Commander in these efforts is one that is still new to the majority of senior and mid-grade Officers. The recent establishment of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) to support Combatant Commanders as they work to ensure unity of effort is a demonstrative move in the right direction. The JIACG is not a panacea; it is a starting point. The establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) will further the ability to corral and coordinate these efforts so that they are complementary. Issues that will immediately gain the attention of the Combatant Commander range from security to logistics, but his attention can not be limited to what his staff does. Equally important is how his staff functions. While staffs of a Combatant Commander are well organized and equipped to plan and execute campaigns of direct action, these organizational abilities do not easily lend themselves to localized operations in which the military serves with other agencies and countries in a unity of effort to pre-empt battles before it can occur. This might necessitate a new alignment of staff, some to act as LNOs while others may serve in entirely new capacities as determined by the course of operations. Additionally, prioritization of reserve time is critical, as the majority of the expertise in Civil

Affairs (CA) comes from reservists. Without question, the strength of the CA efforts in the JIACG and CMOC will directly impact the success of the Combatant Commander's mission.

Finally, the Commander needs to personally nurture and cultivate his relationship with the Ambassadors in his theater. It goes without saying that his forces will, quite likely, be taking orders that emanate from these individuals. The strength of this bond can resolve inter-agency conflicts and institutional differences at their outset and ensure that a unity of effort is achieved across the spectrums of power that is being exercised in the theater. This political process of establishing and maintaining Argentina's connection to globalization, thereby removing the existing conditions that support Hezbollah recruitment, is one of longevity. It will require the same degree of support in the beginning as it will in 10 years.

CONCLUSION

“Hezbollah may be the A-team of terrorists and maybe Al Qaeda is actually the B-team.”
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, September 5, 2002

Argentina suffered two deadly attacks at the hands of Hezbollah in a two-year period. Both attacks were conducted in the same manner; both were conducted in the same city. The first attack served as a lesson for both the locals and the terrorists alike. Argentine officials focused their search on the attackers but failed to look at the conditions that permitted the attack. This failure allowed Hezbollah to replace the operatives in two years and repeat the attack, this time with a death toll more than six times greater.

Nasrallah has shown his ability to focus his efforts in areas where the ground is fertile for his ideology, thereby being ripe for his recruitment efforts. He has proven his ability to master all the forms available to him to sell his ideology to grow terrorist networks. He has

developed his own media outlets as well as using others to his advantage; i.e. CNN, CBS, and other world media sources. He has demonstrated the outcome of this approach.

In many respects the U.S. has effectively countered Hezbollah globally through efforts directed at building globalized economies and enhanced law enforcement efforts based on our war on drugs. The theater commander has the ability to synthesize these efforts and their multiple approaches in areas that are outside of globalization. He has the ability to act as the force multiplier and ensure unity of effort. This approach was summarized by John Waghelstein, Naval War College Professor, “You can’t just use the military. It’s got to be a constant din of propaganda; it’s got to be economic support...As long as you only go after the guy with the weapon you’re missing the important part.”^{xxii} By reconnecting those excluded from globalization, removing the lure of Islamist ideology, and exposing Hezbollah’s perversion of the message of the Koran, terrorist recruitment can be stopped.

This is not a quick fix, it requires accepting that the results of these approaches will not be seen today or tomorrow; it requires the long-view. These approaches, when combined with the efforts already underway against current operatives, will enable the Combatant Commander to ensure the safety that he serves to protect and successfully counter the global terrorist threat we face today.

NOTES

ⁱ David Montero, "The Battle for Lebanon Explodes in Argentina," lkd, PBS Frontline at "Lebanon – Party of God. Bullets to Ballot Box: A History of Hezbollah Page." <<http://www.pbs.org/frontline/stories/lebanon/tl04.html>>, (n.d.), 2.

ⁱⁱ Robert Oakley "Interview with Robert Oakley," interview by David Lewis (Frontline, 2001), <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/interviews/oakley.html>>, (2001), 10.

ⁱⁱⁱ Blanca Madani, "Hezbollah's Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol 4 No 1. (January 2002), 2.

^{iv} *ibid*, (4).

^v Roberto Cosso, quoted in Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, (New York: Bonus Books, 2003), 23.

^{vi} Roy Oliver, "Neo-Fundamentalism," SSRC, (n.d.) <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/roy_text_only.htm> [11 January 2004], .

^{vii} Nabil Al-Milchem, "Biographical Sketch of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah : 'The Nasrallah Enigma,'" Al-Bawaba, (November 10, 2003), <http://majdur.htmlplanet.com/alMasakin/volume_201/biographcial_sketch_of_sayyed_hassan_nasrallah.pdf>, 1.

^{viii} *Ibid*, 3.

^{ix} Madani, 3.

^x *Ibid*, 3.

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^{xii} Hassan Nasrallah, "Speech to Followers," al-Watan al-Arabi, <<http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/hizbullah/pb/app6.htm>>, (June 17, 1994), 2.

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^{xx} U.S. President, “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” (February 2003), 230.

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